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INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE WORLD COURT AND THE 
FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS CASE 
Edward McWhinney* 
I. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND JUDICIAL 
LAW-MAKING 
The decision of the French government to conduct high altitude 
nuclear test explosions in the South Pacific in 1973 and 1974 has, 
quite obviously, some important implications for that new interna-
tional environmental protection law that burgeoned so suddenly in 
the late 1960s and that may already have passed its apogee. 1 The 
world energy crisis has, after all, from the end of 1973 onwards, 
turned national decision-makers' attention increasingly to problems 
of international trade and balance of payments, at the expense, if 
need be, of interests in ecology and the human life-style. In another, 
more general way, the French government's nuclear test explosions 
represent a phase in the definition and concretization of that older 
international law of good neighborliness or comity that, in its inter-
national relations aspects, draws heavily upon the best civil law and 
common law national legal traditions. 2 Our concern in the present 
study is not with these more general, substantive international law 
questions except insofar as they arise interstitially to our considera-
tion of essentially adjectival law, institutional questions-here, the 
role of the World Court in the international law-making process. 
These adjectival law, institutional questions go to the special com-
petence of the Court in the elaboration and refinement of new norms 
of international law, and to the limitations necessarily imposed on 
the Court by essentially the same considerations that cabin and 
confine judicial review when it operates in a purely internal, na-
tional or municipal law context3-namely, procedural limitations 
inherent in the case/controversy system and even in the advisory 
* Queen's Counsel; Barrister and Solicitor; Professor oflntemational Law and Relations, 
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada; Membre de l'lnstitut de Droit International. 
1. See Goldie, The Nuclear Test Cases: Restraints on Environmental-Harm, 5 J. 
MARITIME L. & COMM. 491 (1974); see generally McWhinney, Changing Science and Technol-
ogy and International Law, 6 IND. L. REV. 172 (1972). 
2. See generally Andrassy, Les relations internationales de voisinage, 79 RECUEIL DES 
CouRs 77 (1951); see also Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.l.A.A. 1905 (1949); Sneider, 
Trail Smelter-Fall, 13 WORTERBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS, 447 (Strupp-Schlochauer eds. 1962); 
see also Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. 22. 
3. Cf. E. McWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW 233 et seq. (4th ed. 1969). 
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opinion base to the exercise of Court jurisdiction; intellectual limi-
tations imposed by the canons of construction and by conventional 
legal reasoning, both civil law and common law; limitations of ex-
pertise stemming from highly specialized judicial training and 
academic legal formations, whether civil law or common law, that 
traditionally do not extend outside law as strictly defined to other 
social sciences like economics, commerce, and sociology, or a fortiori 
to the natural sciences and engineering; political limitations result-
ing from the dependent character of the judicial office, the essen-
tially indirect modes of judicial selection and the absence of any-
thing approaching the "political mandate" that only a direct popu-
lar election can confer; and, finally, the limitations of effectiveness, 
stemming from the lack of any practical, institutionally-based au-
thority to follow up Court decisions with concrete enforcement pro-
cedures against recalcitrant parties refusing to accept the Court's 
decisions or even to acknowledge its jurisdiction in the first place. 
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE FRENCH 
NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
The ultimate historical foundations of the French government's 
high-altitude nuclear tests in 1973 and 1974 are to be found in more 
than a decade of "Third Force" thinking on the subject of an inde-
pendent French and European foreign policy, spurred on by the 
rapid approach of the Soviet-U.S. detente and foreshadowed by the 
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. In 
its specifically Gaullist manifestations, European "Third Force" 
doctrine looked to the development of a distinctively French or con-
tinental European nuclear "force de frappe" as a deterrent to possi-
ble Soviet adventurism in continental Europe consequent upon the 
Soviet-U.S. detente and any resultant withdrawal of the U.S. nu-
clear strike force from Europe. 4 
4. See, e.g., French Nuclear Tests, Comments by Michel Jobert, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, July 24, 1973, (Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'lnformation, 
New York); Declaration on Disarmament, Statement by His Excellency Louis de Guiringaud, 
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations before the General 
Assembly First Committee, November 1, 1973; see also the comment by the long-time Gaul-
list leader and former Prime Minister, Michel Debre, in LE MoNDE (Paris) of July 24, 1973 
(cited in 78 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT lNT'L Pueuc 793 at 811 (1974)): 
"Si la France n'avait pas fait l'effort de devenir Puissance nucleaire ou si elle cessait 
de l'etre, son siege permanent au Conseil de Securite de l'O.N. U. lui serait bientOt 
enleve." (Editors Note: The immediately following and all subsequent English trans-
lations were inserted by the Editors. Trans. T. Pitegoff.) 
[If France had not made the effort to become a nuclear power, or if she ceased 
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Some of the more intransigent Western political opponents of 
the late President Charles de Gaulle have argued that the quest for 
French or continental Europen nuclear weapons and the concomi-
tant French government investment in a systematic nuclear test 
program represented no more than a stage in the development of a 
"politique de grandeur," involving the pursuit of symbols and na-
tional prestige unrelated to specific and immediate national foreign 
policy objectives. Be that as it may, the French government did not 
sign the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, and has certainly 
refused to accept the avant-garde legal argument that the princi-
ples of the Test Ban Treaty, with their interdiction of nuclear tests 
in the atmosphere and in certain other specific places have, by 
virtue of the near universality (though not unanimity) of national 
acceptance, become part of general, customary international law 
binding even on non-signatories to the Treaty as a sort of interna-
tional jus cog ens. 
By contrast, the Australian and New Zealand governments, 
during the earlier, pre-detente era when they were each part of the 
United States-created interlocking system of Western defensive mil-
itary alliances, had cooperated freely, and indeed most positively 
and enthusiastically, with the United States and British govern-
ments in those governments' development and testing of their own 
nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The active assistance and 
involvement of the Australian and New Zealand governments in 
these nuclear test explosions had extended, specifically, to territo-
ries and areas under the jurisdiction and control of those govern-
ments themselves. The political justification for the Australian and 
New Zealand support for, and direct participation in, nuclear test 
explosions in the South Pacific in that earlier historical era, had to 
be founded upon the argument that the possession by the Western 
political-military bloc of properly-tried and tested nuclear weapons 
was a crucial element in the policy of nuclear deterrence-itself part 
of the over-all Western policy of "containment" during the Cold 
War. 
The present political switch of the Australian and New Zealand 
governments from their erstwhile uninhibited direct involvement in 
the U.S. and British nuclear testing in the South Pacific area has 
to find its own special political justification, if at all, in the ending 
to be one, her permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council would be quickly taken 
from her.] 
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of the Cold War era and concomitant emergence of the Soviet-U.S. 
detente. These special societal facts of the world community from 
the early 1960s onwards lead to the politically more contentious 
argument-contentious, since not accepted by France or by China 
or by certain other lesser powers-that the achievement and 
concretization of Soviet-U.S. detente in the Moscow Summit 
Accords of May, 1972, has rendered otiose and unnecessary both the 
nuclear deterrence policy in general and, specifically, the acquisi-
tion of new nuclear technology on the part of countries not now 
having their own nuclear force de frappe. Actually, the political 
switch of the Australian and New Zealand governments over nu-
clear testing in the South Pacific area after 1972 finds its explana-
tion in simpler, internal political considerations-the replacement 
that year, in both countries, of long-term, right-wing, conservative 
governments that had been committed, from the beginning of the 
Cold War era onwards, to a strong Western military and nuclear 
posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, by Socialist, Labour Party gov-
ernments with long historical traditions of political neutralism and 
of support for general, or if need be, unilateral disarmament. 
III. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE FRENCH 
NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
By the beginning of 1972, there had been a total of 869 nuclear 
test explosions of which nearly two-thirds had been U.S. explosions 
and nearly a third Soviet; the French contribution being 43 tests (or 
just under 5 per cent), and the Chinese 12 tests.5 The tests divided 
almost evenly between aerial and underground explosions, with a 
slight preponderance in favour of the underground tests. This pre-
ponderance was most marked in the case of the United States-
being almost two to one-though the ratio was increasing all the 
time, in the case of the two super-powers, the Soviet Union and 
the United States, as a result of their compliance with their obliga-
tions under the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and as a result 
also of their scientific perfection of their own national systems of 
underground nuclear testing. In the case of France, however, the 43 
5. LIVRE BLANC SUR LES EXPERIENCES NUCLEAIRES, (Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, ser-
vice de presse et d'information, Paris) (June, 1973), at 3 [hereinafter cited as LIVRE BLANC]; 
See generally France: 1° Nouvelle serie de'experiences nucleaires dans le Pacifique (25 juin -
29 juillet 1972), 77 REVUE GtNERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 840 (1973); France: 1° Nouvelle 
serie d'experiences nucleaires dans le Pacifique (21 juillet -28 aozit 1973), 78 REVUE GtNtRALE 
DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 793 (1974). 
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nuclear test explosions up to the beginning of 1972 were broken 
down into 30 above-the-ground, and 13 underground explosions. All 
French underground explosions were conducted in the Sahara, as 
were 4 atmospheric tests; while the remaining 26 atmospheric tests 
were conducted in the Pacific.6 
The particular French tests which were the subject of the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand complaints in 1973 and 1974 were con-
ducted at the site of the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa in the 
Tonamotou Archipelago in French Polynesia. The reasons given by 
the French government for the choice of this site were that the 
territory concerned was French and also that it was uninhabited and 
situated in a zone seldom frequented by maritime lines or commer-
cial airlines. In addition, the site was far away from inhabited re-
gions-1,200 kilometres from Tahiti; 990 kilometres from Pitcairn 
Island; between 2,500 and 2,800 kilometres from Tonga and Fiji; 
6,400 kilometres from the South American coast; and, lastly, 4,200 
kilometres from Auckland, New Zealand and 6, 700 kilometres from 
Sydney, Australia.7 
The French tests in the South Pacific were not merely above-
the-ground; the blasts were effectuated under a balloon, and not on 
the ground's surface. According to the French government, the pur-
pose of the blasts' being made under a balloon and at a certain 
altitude, was to avoid all interaction between the ball of fire result-
ing from the explosion and the surface of the earth. This was to 
avoid an effect that normally occurs in on-the-ground explosions, 
namely the tearing up of important quantities of radioactive debris 
and earth which, after vaporization and cooling off, fall to earth in 
the form of granules supporting fissionable products. In the case of 
explosions under balloons at high altitudes-following this scien-
tific thesis-the radioactive particles which form are, because of 
the absence of intimate contact with the surface of the ground and 
the water, of minimal dimensions and they elevate themselves very 
rapidly into the upper atmosphere or stratosphere where they are 
dispersed and remain for long periods while their radioactive quality 
is diminished.8 
The French government contended that the effects of the 
French nuclear test explosions in the South Pacific upon the com-
plainant states, Australia and New Zealand (and also Fiji, which 
6. LIVRE BLANC, supra note 5, at 3. 
7. Id. at 4-5. 
8. Id. at 3-4. 
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eventually sought, unsuccessfully, to intervene before the World 
Court) were slight. It was pointed out that the prevailing winds at 
all altitudes in the South Pacific over the French test site are from 
West to East-that is, in the opposite direction from the complain-
ant states and towards an ocean zone devoid of inhabitants until the 
South American coast is reached 6,000 kilometres to the East. Fur-
ther, it was contended, the French tests represented very small 
quantities of radiation in comparison to the over-all total of nuclear 
experiments-in fact 1.8 percent of the radiation resulting from the 
various U.S., Russian, Chinese, and British tests; and that the doses 
of radiation involved in the French nuclear tests were very much less 
than the total levels of natural radiation to be found in various parts 
of the world today (for example in Brittany, the Vosges, or the 
Central Massif of France itself; or in Minaes Geraes in Brazil or in 
Kerala in India). Again, it was contended that the annual levels of 
artificial radiation resulting, for example, from medical tests in the 
industrialized countries, or even from a simple intercontinental jet 
aircraft flight, were very much greater than the radiation doses 
resulting from the French tests in the South Pacific.9 Statistically-
based arguments of this sort are, of course, always open to counter-
demonstration, and the French arguments on this point were in fact 
immediately contested by the Australian and New Zealand govern-
ments. Nevertheless, in the first phase decision of the World Court 
on the Australian-New Zealand complaints against France, handed 
down on June 22, 1973, Judge Ignacio-Pinto, in his dissenting opin-
ion to the Court majority ruling, made telling use (against the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand arguments) of a New Zealand study pub-
lished in 1972 by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
which concluded that testing of nuclear weapons up to that time 
would "not present a significant health hazard to the people of New 
Zealand or the Pacific Territories with which it is associated"; and 
that the then proposed French nuclear tests in the South Pacific 
would "add fractionally but not significantly to the long-lived fall-
out in these areas."10 
9. Id. at 8-9. 
10. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J. 135, 164 (dissenting opinion of Judge Ignacio-Pinto). See also LIVRE BLANC, supra note 
5, at 59-61 Annexe A . VII, (Reunion entre experts scientifiques australiens et francais a 
l'Academie australienne des sciences a Canberra 7 au 9 mai 1973); 65-66, Annexe A, IX, 
(Citations de personnalites ou de publications etrangeres sur l'innocuite de nos experiences, 
Australie, Nouvelle-Zelande); see also France: 1 ° Nouvelle s~rie d'experiences nucleaires 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/3
1975] Nuclear Tests Cases 
IV. THE JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH 
NUCLEAR TESTS CASE 
15 
The political decision by the newly-elected Socialist govern-
ments in Australia and New Zealand to challenge the French gov-
ernment's holding of above-the-ground nuclear tests in the South 
Pacific in 1973, also involved a secondary, machinery-institutional 
decision involving the choice of means or techniques for effectuating 
that challenge-namely, the eschewing of conventional diplomatic 
negotiations and protestations in favor of juridical action before 
the World Court. The main lines of the Australian-New Zealand 
argument on the substantive issue of the legality of the French 
nuclear tests were easy enough to anticipate in advance of any ac-
tual pleadings, that is, the claimed existence of general principles 
of international law, recognized and re-stated by the Moscow Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963 (but not necessarily coterminous with that 
treaty or limited to it for purposes of their juridical force) outlawing 
above-the-ground nuclear tests; the claimed existence, at the inter-
national, not less than at the national law level, of principles of good 
neighborliness forbidding one state from gratuitously causing 
harm to the territory, people or property of another state and applic-
able to the case of fall-out from nuclear test explosions; and, finally, 
claimed interferences with well-recognized principles of state 
sovereignty caused by nuclear test explosion fall-outs and by the 
proclamation of security zones on the High Seas and by similar 
control measures during the pendency of such nuclear tests. 
Before any such substantive law issues could be reached, how-
dans le Pacifique (21 juillet - 28 aout 1973), 78 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 793. 
821-22 (1974): 
A la fin des experiences le directeur du laboratoire national des radiations de la 
Nouvelle Zelande, M. H.J. Yeabsley, declara le 30 aout que des traces de radiation 
provenant du deuxieme essai nucleaire franc;ais, celui du 28 juillet, avaient ete dece-
lees a Apia, a l'ouest des 1les Samoa, les 3 et 4 aout, mais que ces traces etaient 
inferieures au niveau tolere et ne presentaient aucum danger. Le 18 novembre le 
directeur de l'Institut national d'energie .nucleaire du Perou, M. Walter Llamosas, 
confirmait que les radiations constatees dans son pays apres les explosions 
n 'atteignaient qu 'un degre infinitesimal. 
[At the end of the tests the director of the National Radiation Laboratory of New 
Zealand, Mr. H.J. Yeabsley, stated on August 30th that the traces of radiation which 
were produced on July 28th, in the second French nuclear test, were detected on 
August 3rd and 4th at Apia, west of the Samoan islands, but that these traces were 
at a tolerable level and presented no danger whatsoever. On November 18th the 
director of the National Institute of Nuclear Energy of Peru, Mr. Walter Llamosas, 
confirmed that the radiation recorded in his country after the explosions reached only 
an infinitessimal degree.] 
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ever, with all their implications for the development of a "new" 
international law as to environmental protection or a new species of 
jus cogens in the area of nuclear disarmament and control of nuclear 
testing, a formidable adjectival law issue had to be overcome-
namely, the jurisdiction of the World Court to hear a complaint 
against France on the part of Australia and New Zealand. In 
World Court jurisprudence, not less than in national jurisprudence, 
the preliminary, procedural question of jurisdiction must normally 
be decided before the substantive legal issues can be canvassed by 
the court. Since the World Court's jurisdiction is, by definition in 
terms of Article 36 of the Court statute, 11 consensual and established 
in the ultimate by the will of the party against whom the jurisdic-
tion is sought to be invoked, the first enquiry had to be directed to 
the nature and character of the French government's acceptance of 
the Court's jurisdiction. At the time of the Austrialian-New Zealand 
complaint to the Court, the relevant French acceptance of the 
Court's jurisdiction was that filed by the French government on 
May 20, 1966, in which the French government formally accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in terms of Article 36 (2) 
of the Court statute, but also excluded from that acceptance "dis-
putes concerning activities connected with national defence. " 12 
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36: 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and 
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties 
and conventions in force. 
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they 
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in rel~tion to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court · in all legal 
disputes .... 
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time. 
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the 
Registrar of the Court. 
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the 
parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in 
accordance with their terms. 
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall 
be settled by the decision of the Court. 
25 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 779, (1971). 
12. Declaration franc;aise d'acceptation de la jurisdiction obligatoire de la Cour interna-
tionale de Justice (20 mai 1966), (M. Couve de Murville, signed at Paris, May 16, 1966). 
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique fran<;aise, je declare reconna'itre 
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In the French government's view, the then-current French nu-
clear tests in the South Pacific were activities connected with the 
French national defence and therefore ipso facto excluded from the 
World Court's jurisdiction, with the consequence that the Court 
would have no competence to proceed with the Australian-New Zea-
land complaint. On this ground, the French government refused to 
recognize the existence of any valid legal dispute concerning France 
of which the Court could take cognizance, and refused to enter a 
formal appearance before the Court. The French government, in a 
letter to the Court on May 16, 1973, formally invoked the "national 
defence" reservation to jurisdiction and submitted that the 
Australian-New Zealand complaint should be removed from the 
list. The Court itself had been advised of the Australian-New Zea-
land complaint on May 9, 1973, and on May 14, 1973, of a further 
Australian-New Zealand request for the indication of interim mea-
sures; and the Court had advised the French government accord-
ingly. 
France therefore took no further part in the proceedings of the 
Court, though the French member of the Court, Judge Gros, as a 
regularly elected judge, sat on the case and participated fully in the 
interim and final judgments.13 The French government White Paper 
on the Nuclear Tests, published in Paris in June, 1973, 14 constitutes 
comme obligatoire de plein droit et sans convention speciale vis-a-vis des autres 
membres des Nations Unies qui acceptent la meme obligation, c'est-a-dire sous con-
dition de reciprocite, la juridiction de la Cour conformement a l'article 36, para-
graphe 2, du Statut, jusqu'a ce qu'il soit donne notification de l'abrogation de cette 
acceptation, pour tous les differends qui s'eleveraient au sujet de faits ou de situa-
tions posterieurs a la presente declaration, a l'exception . . . . 
3. - des differends nes d'une guerre OU d'hostilites internationales, des differends nes 
a l'occasion d'une crise interessant la securite de la nation ou de toute mesure ou 
action s 'y rapportant et des differends concernant des activites se rapportant a la 
defense nationale . . . . 
[In the name of the Government of the French Republic, I hereby recognize as 
compulsory without special agreements with respect to other members of the United 
Nations which accept the same obligation, i.e. under the condition of reciprocity, the 
jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, until 
notification is given of the abrogation of this acceptance, for all disputes arising from 
facts or situations subsequent to this declaration, with the exception .... 
3. of disputes arising from war or international hostilities, from a crisis affecting 
national security or any measure or action related thereto, or disputes concerning 
activities related to the national defense . . . .] 
LIVRE BLANC, supra note 5, at 93 (Annex B XI). 
13. See generally Eisemann, Les effets de la non comparution devant la cour internation-
ale de justice, 19 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT lNT'L 351 (1973). 
14. LIVRE BLANC, supra note 5. 
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a succinct and well-reasoned statement of that government's posi-
tion on the facts and law of the then-pending Court proceedings, 
and fills the gap created by the absence of French government pres-
ence in the actual oral pleadings before the Court. In many respects 
the French White Paper approaches the character of the factum or 
extended written brief, covering formal legal issues and the factual 
and legal argumentation advanced by any one party in support of 
his own position thereon, common in U.S. Supreme Court practice. 
In the context of World Court proceedings where a heavy-some 
would say too heavy-emphasis is given to oral pleadings, at the 
expense of written argument, it might be said that the French White 
Paper constitutes the clearest and most concise formal statement by 
any of the parties to the nuclear tests conflict as to its own position 
in the matter, and a very welcome extramural addition to the 
Court's records. 15 
By contrast, the Australian and New Zealand position had to 
be to deny that a French limited acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion concluded the matter of jurisdiction. The Australian and New 
Zealand governments pointed to the General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, which they claimed to 
be still in force and binding France to the Court's jurisdiction in 
terms of Article 37 of the Court statute. 16 To this argument, the 
French government replied that the General Act of 1928 was inti-
mately bound up with the League of Nations and must be regarded 
as having lapsed into desuetude with the collapse of the League of 
Nations system; and that, in any case, even if the General Act of 
1928 were to be regarded as still in force, the latest 1966 French 
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with its "national defence" 
reservation, must, on normal principles of construction, reduce and 
restrict-to the extent of any incompatibility-the earlier, not so 
limited, French acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction based on the 
1928 General Act.17 
15. See Lacharriere, Cour internationale de justice. Commentaires sur la position juri-
dique de la France a l'egard de la liceite de ses experiences nucleaires, 19 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS 
DE DROIT INT'L 235 (1973). 
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 37: 
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a 
tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present 
Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
25 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 779 (1971). 
17. LIVRE BLANC, supra note 16, at 19-20. 
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Strangely, the Australian and New Zealand governments do 
not appear to have stressed too strongly the issue of whether the 
"national defence" reservation was itself subject to judicial review 
and interpretation; either it was to be a purely subjective test and 
thus self-defining from the viewpoint of the French government, or 
it was to be objective, and therefore capable of scrutiny as to 
whether there was, in fact, a real and proximate relation to national 
defence of the activities in dispute. A more substantial objection of 
the French government, with important implications for the future 
of the World Court's jurisdiction, was that the question of nuclear 
tests now being submitted to the World Court by Australia and New 
Zealand was not fundamentally juridical, but purely political. This 
French objection thus raised the basic issue of the boundary be-
tween law and politics for purposes of the World Court's practical 
exercise of jurisdiction.18 For the objection focused upon the very 
real question of whether the Court as, at best, a dependent policy-
making organ, should not, in simple political self-defence and as a 
rule of elementary political prudence, apply canons of judicial self-
restraint in the interest of immunizing itself as far as possible from 
great political causes cel~bres. 
V. THE WORLD COURT ORDER OF JUNE 22, 1973, 19 AND 
THE GRANT OF INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION 
If there were no Court jurisdiction in the first place, there 
would, presumably, be no Court jurisdiction to issue interim mea-
sures pending final determination; otherwise the Court would be 
hoisting itself by its own bootstraps into jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, to allow a mere denial of jurisdiction by any one party to end 
the matter then and there would be a most intolerable situation for 
18. Id. at 20. 
La Cour n'est pas competente, enfin, parce que l'affaire qui lui est soumise n'est pas 
fondamentalement un differend d'ordre juridique. Elle se trouve, en fait et par divers 
biais, invitee a prendre position sur un probleme purement politique et militaire. Ce 
n'est, selon le Gouvernement fran<;.ais, ni son role ni sa vocation. 
[The Court lacks jurisdiction, in short, because the matter submitted to it is 
basically not a dispute of legal dimensions. The Court, in fact, is asked to take a 
position, by one approach or another, on a problem that is purely political and 
military. This is, according to the French government, neither its role nor its pur-
pose.] 
19. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order) [1973] l.C.J. 
99; Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order) [1973] l.C.J. 
135; see also Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of 
Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1974). 
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any Court. The simple and certainly the most direct solution for the 
Court in the present case would have been to rule on the jurisdic-
tional issue forthwith and then, if it found in favor of jurisdiction, 
to proceed to at least preliminary examination of the substantive 
legal issues, with the right to grant interim relief measures at any 
time once the issue of jurisdiction had been determined in favor 
of the existence of jurisdiction. 
This part of the Court's Interim Order of June 22, 1973, and the 
supporting judicial opinions in the Nuclear Tests Cases are not, it 
must be said, completely satisfying. The jurisdictional issue did not, 
on its face, seem a particularly complex matter or one requiring 
unusual time for decision. It may be suggested that it called for 
either a strict application of the Court's statute with its stress on 
the consensual aspect of adherence by states to the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction and a conclusion, presumably, against jurisdiction 
or a clear policy decision by the Court stressing why it felt it desir-
able to adopt a flexible approach to jurisdiction and to extend the 
Court's competence wherever possible-if need be against the 
direct wishes of the states concerned. None of the majority judicial 
opinions filed in support of the Court's Order of June 22, 1973, treat 
this point directly. Instead, the majority opinions proceed to the 
issue of the need to grant interim measures, without canvassing in 
depth the preliminary, procedural, adjectival law issue of whether 
jurisdiction exists in the first place~the necessary condition pre-
cedent to any ruling on the substantive legal issues. 
The actual judicial holdings of June 22, 1973, in the Nuclear 
Tests Cases, taken in concert, constitute an enigma. We know that 
two of the judges-the President, Judge Lachs, and the American 
judge, Judge Dillard-were prevented by illness from participating 
in the case. Counting the ad hoc judge from Australia, Sir Garfield 
Barwick, this meant a bench composed of 14 judges deciding on the 
Interim Order. The Court, in its actual Order signed by the Vice-
President, Judge Ammoun, indicates that its majority decision was 
rendered by eight votes to six. 20 Among the majority group com-
prising in all eight judges, four other judges-Judge Jimenez de 
20. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] l.C.J. 
99, 106. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I. c .J. 135, 142-43. 
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Arechaga, 21 Sir Humphrey Waldock, 22 Judge Nagendra Singh, 23 and 
ad hoc judge Sir Garfield Barwick24-filed individual, specially con-
curring opinions. Just who are the remaining three majority judges 
is not indicated in the Court's actual Order, and these .remaining 
three majority judges are nowhere identified expressly by name. 
Among the minority judges, Judges Forster, 25 Gros, 26 Petren27 and 
Ignacio-Pinto28 each filed individual dissenting opinions. But the 
other two minority judges are nowhere identified in the Court's 
Order, or in the various opinions filed in support of it. 
What are we to make of the votes and opinions of the five judges 
unaccounted for in the Court's Order or in the various individual 
opinions, both majority and minority-Judges Bengson, Onyeama, 
de Castro, Morozov and Ruda? It is not, on its face, a very satisfy-
ing official explanation and rationalization of what is, even in terms 
of the Interim Order, a fairly novel decision that would have bene-
fited by some substantial justification in terms of past Court juris-
prudence. The logical conclusion must be that the internal differ-
ences of the Court were marked and deeply-felt, and that this 
accounts for an apparently deliberate decision on the part of a 
number of judges not to render explicit either their reasons or 
their actual vote on the Order of June 22, 1973. 
21. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] l.C.J. 
99, 106. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J. 135, 143. 
22. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] I.C.J. 
99, 108. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J. 135, 144. 
23. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] I.C.J. 
99, 108. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C .J. 135, 145. 
24. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] I.C.J. 
99, 110. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
1.C.J. 135, 146. 
25. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] l.C.J. 
99, 111. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J. 135, 148. 
26. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] l.C.J . 
99, 115. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J . 135, 149. 
27. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] I.C.J . 
99, 124. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J. 135, 159. 
28. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] I.C.J. 
99, 128. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Interim Protection Order), [1973] 
I.C.J . 135, 163. 
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VI. THE WORLD COURT JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 20, 
1974:29 THE ISSUE HAS BECOME MOOT! 
The final judgment of the Court in the Nuclear Tests Cases, 
rendered on December 20, 1974, throws some light on, but gives no 
complete explanation of, the internal politics of the Court's Interim 
Order of June 22, 1973. It is officially indicated, in the final judg-
ment of the Court, that the decision was rendered by a vote of nine 
to six. 30 Judge-President Lachs and Judge Dillard had each re-
turned to take part in the final judgment, President Lachs in fact 
signing the majority judgment, rendered by the vote of nine to six. 
This time the dissenting judges are clearly identified by name, in 
terms of a joint dissenting opinion, signed by Judges Onyeama, 
Dillard, Jimenez de Arechaga, and Sir Humphrey Waldock,31 and 
in two individual dissenting opinions filed by Judge de Castro32 and 
ad hoc Judge Barwick.33 The change from the Court minority of four 
for purposes of the issuance of interim measures of protection on 
June 22, 1973, to the minority of six dissenting from the Court's final 
judgment of December 20, 1974, is partly accounted for by the ab-
sence from the Court rendering the final judgment of Vice-President 
Ammoun and by the evident defection of Judge Nagendra Singh 
from the erstwhile majority for the Interim Order. Since, however, 
Judge Dillard, returning from his sick bed to take part in the final 
judgment, now rallied to the erstwhile majority and new minority 
position in favor of jurisdiction, this would leave only one judge 
unaccounted for from the Interim Order majority of eight. Was it, 
perhaps Judge Bengzon, who publicly adhered to a joint declara-
tion, signed by himself and Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de 
Ar~chaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock on the issue of the advance 
"leak" of the Court's actual vote on the final judgment of December 
20, 1974, and appended to the Court's final judgment?34 It is simply 
not clear from the final judgment and the individual judicial opin-
ions filed with it. The new majority of December 20, 1974, only 
29. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253; Nuclear 
Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), (Judgment) [1974] I.C.J. 457. 
30. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 272; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J . 457, 478. 
31. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 312; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 457, 494. 
32. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 372; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J . 457, 524. 
33. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 391; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment) , [1974] l.C.J. 457, 525. 
34. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 273. 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/3
1975] Nuclear Tests Cases 23 
shows, as we have said, the official judgment of the Court signed by 
Judge-President Lachs, 35 and individual, specially concurring opin-
ions filed by Judges Forster,36 Gros, 37 Petren38 and lgnacio-Pinto.39 
The final judgment of the Court of December 20, 1974, ad-
dressed itself to questions, essentially, of procedural, adjectival law. 
Though, in the end result, it is a decision not to rule on the substan-
tive international law questions, the Court nevertheless addresses 
itself to a special issue not adverted to in the earlier argument and 
in the earlier judgment and judicial opinions issued for purposes of 
the Interim Order of June 22, 1973. This special issue is one which, 
because of its particular factual base, could presumably not have 
been adverted to before. The Court majority judgment of December 
20, 1974 is therefore not in formal conflict with the majority judg-
ment of June 22, 1973, and in no way purports to overrule that 
earlier judgment; though, in the end, as suggested, it does effec-
tively depart from or reject the judicial philosophy that dominated 
the earlier judgment. 
The Court's reasoning, for purposes of the final judgment, 
adopts what may be called a basically "Anglo-Saxon" juridical ap-
proach to the exercise of Court jurisdiction. It concludes, in essence, 
that the original dispute between Australia-New Zealand and 
France, has become moot because of supervening facts affecting 
France's position; and that there is, in consequence, no longer, 
effectively, a case or controversy before the Court and no basis, 
therefore, for the Court's purporting to further exercise jurisdic-
tion in the matter. The reasoning and internal logic is impeccable; 
and the result is one of which the late Mr. Justice Brandeis of the 
U.S. Supreme Court would certainly have approved in its insist-
ence upon the existence of a proper jurisdictional base as a prior, 
adjectival law condition to the issuance of any judicial pronounce-
ment upon substantive law questions.'0 As is noted in the Court's 
35. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 254; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 457, 458. 
36. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 275; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 457, 479. 
37. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 276; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 457, 480. 
38. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 298; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 457, 483. 
39. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 308; Nu-
clear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 457, 493. 
40. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 344-45 (1936) (Brandeis, 
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official opinion in support of its final judgment: 
The Court has in the past indicated considerations which would 
lemd it to decline to give judgment. The present case is one in which 
"circumstances that have ... arisen render any adjudication de-
void of purpose" (Northern Cameroons, Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 
1963 p. 38). The Court therefore sees no reason to allow the continu-
ance of proceedings which it knows are bound to be fruitless. While 
judicial settlement may provide a path to international harmony in 
circumstances of conflict, it is none the less true that the needless 
continuance of litigation is an obstacle to such harmony. 
Thus the Court finds that no further pronouncement is required 
in the present case. It does not enter into the adjudicatory functions 
of the Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it has reached the 
conclusion that the merits of the case no longer fall to be deter-
mined. The object of the claim having clearly disappeared, there is 
nothing on which to give judgment. 41 
Accepting the Judgement's fundamental procedural, adjectival 
law premise that the Court should not proceed to render substantive 
decisions on disputes that no longer exist, there could conceivably 
be an argument as to the nature and quality of the facts effective-
ly causing the disappearance of the original dispute between 
Australia-New Zealand and France-in effect, the declarations by 
various high officials and spokesmen for the French government 
indicating the termination of any further above-the-ground nuclear 
tests on the part of France in the South Pacific. As the Court had 
little difficulty in establishing, these French governmental declara-
tions were all made at the highest levels of political authority-by 
President Giscard d'Estaing himself, by the French Foreign Minis-
ter, and by the French Minister of Defence-and made in system-
atic, sustained and repeated fashion from June 8, 1974, onwards.42 
To be sure, these declarations were not, for the most part, made in 
formal exchanges with the Australian and New Zealand govern-
ments so as to give use to the more normal style of limited, inter 
partes estoppel. This part of the official opinion for the Court, how-
ever, is imaginative and innovative in the best traditions of World 
Court jurisprudence. It follows along lines already developed by the 
Court in earlier opinions in which it has essayed a new flexibility 
regarding the international law-making process in general and the 
J., concurring); see P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT (1949). 
41. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment) [1974] I.C.J. 253, 271-72. 
42. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment) [1974] I.C.J. 253, 264-66. 
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Court's duty of deference to the older juridical notion that the 
sources of international law doctrine constitute a group of closed 
categories that jelled once and for all in some bygone era and that 
are incapable of creative adjustment to new societal conditions in 
the world community. As the Judgment goes on to note: 
It is well recognised that declarations made by way of unilateral 
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and 
often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making 
the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, 
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow 
a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking 
of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even 
though not made within the context of international negotiations, 
is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid 
pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even 
any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declara-
tion to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent 
with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the 
pronouncment by the State was made. Of course, not all unilateral 
acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain 
position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being 
bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the 
act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action 
is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. 43 
On the issue of the relative degree of formality necessary to 
confer juridical force and status upon such unilateral acts by states, 
the Court's Judgment is clear and categorical: 
With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that 
this is not a domain in which international law imposes any special 
or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in 
writing makes no essential difference, for such statements made in 
particular circumstances may create commitments in interna-
tional law, which does not require that they should be couched in 
written form. Thus the question of form is not decisive. As the Court 
said in its Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case 
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear: 
43. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment) [1974] l.C.J . 253, 267. 
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"Where . . . as is generally the case in international law, 
which places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the 
parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free 
to choose what form they please provided their intention 
clearly results from it." (I. C.J. Reports 1961, p. 31). 
The Court further stated in the same case: " ... the sole rele-
vant question is whether the language employed in any given decla-
ration does reveal a clear intention .. . "(ibid., p. 32).44 
In the ultimate, this part of the Court's determination, involving the 
creation of juridical facts rendering moot the original dispute 
brought before the Court, was rested upon the principle of good 
faith, as part of the new international law of cooperation succeeding 
upon the international law of friendly relations (peaceful coexist-
ence): 
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in 
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becom-
ing increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt 
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the 
binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilat-
eral declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance of 
unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are enti-
tled to require that the obligation thus created be respected. 45 
VII. THE SPECIALLY CONCURRING OPINIONS IN THE 
WORLD COURT JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 20, 1974: 
THERE NEVER WAS A JUSTICIABLE DISPUTE! 
The official opinion for the Court majority, in the final judg-
ment of December 20, 197 4, is based, as I have noted, on procedural, 
adjectival law grounds, and in particular on the premise that courts 
should not proceed to render substantive law rulings once an issue 
becomes moot. If this may be called a ruling on a preliminary, 
jurisdictional question, there remains another such question which, 
it may be argued, the Court should decide, as a matter of logic, as 
its first priority question-namely whether a justiciable dispute ex-
isted in the first place. This is the basis (allowing for individual 
nuances of approach), of the four separate, specially concurring 
opinions filed in the Court's final judgment by Judges Forster, Gros, 
Petren and Ignacio-Pinto, who rallied, nevertheless, to the official 
44. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 267-68. 
45. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J . 253, 268. 
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Court opinion to help constitute the final, nine to six vote in favor 
of rejecting jurisdiction. The official opinion in fact bears all the evi-
dence of a "Chief Justice's" opinion, of the sort made famous by the 
great Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the United States Su-
preme Court, where the presiding officer of a tribunal seeks to bring 
the members of his Court together by maximizing the grounds of 
agreement and concord; and, where necessary, by basing his own 
opinion on deliberately modest grounds so as to rally the greatest 
number of wavering judicial votes possible. 46 
The confirmation of this thesis lies, perhaps, in the statistics of 
the two World Court decisions of June 22, 1973 and December 20, 
1974, respectively: a majority of eight judges in favor of exercising 
jurisdiction, at least for purposes of issuing the Interim Order, which 
would become nine with the return from illness of Judge Dillard, 
finds itself reduced to a minority of six when the Court, for pur-
poses of the final judgment, declines to give judgment on the argu-
ment that the affair has become moot. The minority position in the 
June 22, 1973, Interim Order, and the majority position in the De-
cember 20, 1974, final judgment are sufficiently similar, generically, 
to support the thesis that the crucial switch in votes within the 
Court to make up the new majority declining to give judgment was 
the product of political give-and-take and skills of compromise in-
herent in the exchanges in the Court conference room; and in these 
inter-personal dealings the role of the more senior members of the 
Court-especially of the President if he combines high juridical 
expertise and practical political-diplomatic experience-tends to 
become intellectually persuasive for purposes of the final decision. 
In his specially concurring opinion attached to the final judg-
ment of December 20, 1974, Judge Forster returns to the basic point 
made in his dissenting opinion attached to the Interim Order of 
June 22, 1973: 
That the Australian claim was without object was apparent to 
me from the very first, and not merely subsequent to the recent 
French statements: in my view it lacked object ab initio, and radi-
cally. 
The recent French statements adduced in the reasoning of the 
46. See C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 56-64 (1928). See 
generally McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as conducted by Chief Justice 
Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 19 (1949); Frankfurter, The Administrative Side of Chief Justice 
Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. I (1949); OF LAW AND MEN: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANK-
FURTER 1939-1956, at 133-44 (P. Elman ed. 1956); E. McWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW 217-19, 
231 (4th ed. 1969). 
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Judgment do no more than supplement (to useful purpose, I admit) 
what I conceived to be the legal arguments for removal of the case 
from the Court's list.47 
Judge Forster sought to refute any suggestion that the original 
Australian-New Zealand proceedings or the Court's Interim Order 
of June 22, 1973, whatever the doubts as to their jurisdictional base, 
might have contributed to bringing about a politically acceptable 
result, namely cessation of the French above-the-ground nuclear 
tests: 
... I personally have noted nothing in the French statements which 
could be interpreted as an admission of any breach of positive inter-
national law; neither have I observed in them anything whatever 
bearing any resemblance to a concession wrested from France by 
means of the judicial proceedings and implying the least abandon-
ment of that absolute sovereignty which France, like any other 
State, possesses in the domain of its national defence. 
As for the transition from atmospheric to underground tests, I 
see it simply as a technical step forward which was due to occur; 
that, and no more. 48 
Judge Gros, in his specially concurring opinion to the final 
judgment, recurs to his own earlier, dissenting opinion attached to 
the Court's Interim Order of June 22, 1973, that there never was a 
legal dispute subject to the Court's jurisdiction. He also, however, 
enters into an extended historical examination of the Australian 
government's attitude vis-a-vis the French nuclear tests, demon-
strating that from 1963 until the end of 1972 the Australian 
government had at no time advanced any argument as to the unlaw-
fulness of the French nuclear tests. This particular claim was in fact 
put forward for the first time in an Australian Note of January 3, 
1973, stemming directly from a change of government in Australia 
with the election of a Socialist (Labour) government that was offi-
cially committed to opposing the "development, proliferation, pos-
session and use of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons."49 
On the other hand, from 1952 onwards the Australian government 
had associated itself with various atmospheric explosions above or 
near its own territory, and by its conduct had expressed an un-
equivocal view in favor of the lawfulness of those tests in the 
47. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 275. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 279-80. 
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Pacific-beginning with the British atmospheric nuclear explosion 
effected on October 3, 1952, in the Montebello Islands near the 
northwest coast of Australia, and continuing through the October 
15, 1953, British test at Woomera in Australia; two further series of 
British tests on May 16 and June 19, 1956, in the Montebello Is-
lands, and other British tests on September 27, and October 4, 11 
and 21, 1956, in South Australia. On March 3, 1962, the Australian 
government has specifically approved the United States Govern-
ment's decision to conduct nuclear tests in the South Pacific; and 
on March 16, 1962, had given permission to the United States to 
make use of Christmas Island for nuclear tests, more than 20 such 
tests actually being carried out between April 24 and June 30, 1962, 
with tests at very high altitude being carried out at Johnston Island 
from July 9 to November 4, 1962.50 In contrasting the Australian 
government's approval and active endorsement of British and U.S. 
nuclear tests in the South Pacific with its condemnation of Com-
munist Chinese and French nuclear tests, Judge Gros raised the 
issue of political special pleading: 
It is not unjust to conclude that, in the eyes of the Australian 
Government, what should be applauded in the allies who might 
protect it is to be frowned upon in others: Quad licet Jovi non licet 
bovi . .. . 51 
The Applicant [Australia] has disqualified itself by its con-
duct and may not submit a claim based on a double standard of 
conduct and of law. What was good for Australia along with the 
United Kingdom and the United States cannot be unlawful for other 
States. The Permanent Court of International Justice applied the 
principle "allegans contraria non audiendus est" in the case of 
Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, 1937, P. C.I.J., Se-
ries A/B, No. 70, page 25.52 
The other main theme in Judge Gros's specially concurring opinion 
was the notion that the French nuclear tests constituted a political 
dispute, involving the independence, vital interests or honor of the 
state, and therefore sensibly beyond the jurisdiction of any court. 
Citing with approval the writings of the then Professor Hersch Lau-
50. Id. at 280-82; compare LIVRE BLANC, supra note 5, at 13; id., Appendices B. III 
(Ex traits du 168' Rapport du Comite des petitions du Conseil de tutelle), B. IV (Aide-membre 
du Gouuernment Australien en date du 9 septembre 1963), B. VI (Loi Relative aux essais 
nucleaires de Montebello, adoptee par le parlement australien le 10 juin 1952). 
51. Nuclear Tests Case (Australian v. France) (Judgment) , [1974] l.C .J. 253, 282. 
52. Id. at 285. 
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terpacht and the French government's own draft law on its acces-
sion to the General Act of Geneva of 1928,53 Judge Gros went on to 
conclude: 
There is a certain tendency to submit essentially political con-
flicts to adjudication in the attempt to open a little door to judicial 
legislation and, if this tendency were to persist, it would result in 
the institution, on the international plane, of government by judges; 
such a notion is so opposed to the realities of the present interna-
tional community that it would undermine the very foundations of 
jurisdiction. 54 
Judge Petren, in his specially concurring opinion, relies upon 
Article 67 of the 1972 Rules of Court to conclude that the admissibil-
ity of the original Australian-New Zealand application was of an 
exclusively preliminary character, consideration of which could not 
be deferred until the examination of the merits.55 In Judge Petren's 
view, the admissibility of the application depended on the existence 
of a rule of customary international law prohibiting states from 
carrying out atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons which give rise 
to radioactive fallout on the territory of other states. For these pur-
poses, the resolutions voted in the United Nations General Assem-
bly could not be regarded as equivalent to legal protests made by 
one state to another, but simply as indicating the existence of a 
strong current of opinion in favour of proscribing atmospheric nu-
clear tests. The Australian claim thus belonged to the political do-
main, and was situated outside the framework of international law 
as it exists today. It ". . . was, from the very institution of proceed-
ings, devoid of any object on which the Court could give a deci-
sion .... "56 
Judge Ignacio-Pinto, in his own specially concurring opinion, 
reaffirmed his earlier view, set out in his dissenting opinion to the 
Court's Interim Order of June 22, 1973, that in light of what he 
characterized as the "all too markedly political character" of the 
case, the Australian request should have been rejected from the 
outset as being ill founded. 57 Though regretting that the Court had 
not earlier set out to regulate the questions of jurisdiction and ad-
53. Id. at 283-4. 
54. Id. at 297. 
55. Id. at 304-5. 
56. Id. at 306. 
57. Id. at 308. 
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missibility, 58 Judge Ignacio-Pinto approved the Court's final judg-
ment: 
[l]nasmuch as it respects the principle of sovereign equality of the 
member States of the United Nations. France must not be given 
treatment inferior to that given to all other States possessing 
nuclear weapons, and the Court's competence would not be well 
founded if it related only to the French atmospheric tests. 59 
Judge lgnacio-Pinto's most telling comment, however, is re-
served for the general issue of jurisdiction, and the consensual basis 
on which the World Court's own jurisdiction is predicated: 
[T]he Judgment [of the Court] rightly puts an end to a case one 
of whose consequences would, in my opinion, be disastrous-I refer 
to the disregard of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
Court-and would thereby be likely to precipitate a general flight 
from the jurisdiction of the Court, inasmuch as it would demon-
strate that the Court no longer respects the expression of the will of 
a State which has subordinated its acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction to express reservations. 60 
VIII. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS TO THE WORLD COURT 
JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 20, 1974 
The dissenting judicial votes to the Court's final judgment of 
December 20, 1974, are represented by a joint opinion signed by 
Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de Arechaga and Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, and by the separate opinions on the part of Judge de 
Castro and of ad hoc Judge Barwick. 
The Joint Dissenting Opinion of the four Judges does take up 
specifically the point that the Court majority's procedural holding 
that the Australian-New Zealand complaint has become moot, logi-
cally presupposes an even prior procedural holding that the Court 
had jurisdiction in the first place: 
58. Id. at 310-11. 
59. Id. at 311; compare, id. at 284 (J. Gros, concurring): 
But there is more than one negative aspect to the want of object of the Australian 
claim. The principle of equality before the law is constantly invoked, reaffirmed and 
enshrined in the most solemn texts. This principle would become meaningless if the 
attitude of "to each his rule" were to be tolerated in the practice of States and in 
courts. The proper approach to this matter has been exemplified in Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice's special report to the Institute of International Law: "The Future of Public 
International Law" (1973, pp.35-41). 
60. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 311. 
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It is difficult for us to understand the basis upon which the 
Court could reach substantive findings of fact and law such as those 
imposing on France an international obligation to refrain from fur-
ther nuclear tests in the Pacific, from which the Court deduces that 
the case "no longer has any object", without any prior finding that 
the Court is properly seised of the dispute and has jurisdiction to 
entertain it. . . . 
The conclusion thus seems to us unavoidable that the Court, in 
the process of rendering the present Judgment, has exercised sub-
stantive jurisdiction without having first made a determination of 
its existence and the legal grounds upon which that jurisdiction 
rests.61 
It may be suggested that the main thrust of the four Judges' 
Joint Dissenting Opinion involves, however, a political conception 
somewhat different from that of the Court majority as to the basic 
approach to the exercise of jurisdiction and the extent to which the 
Court should feel itself constrained by traditionally respected case 
and controversy limitations in the exercise of a judicial lawmaking 
role at the instigation of individual parties. 
Inherent in the majority opinion of the Court is the notion that 
it is for the Court to identify the object of the litigation before the 
Court and that it is not necessarily constrained by the subjective 
pleadings of the parties: 
Thus it is the Court's duty to isolate the real issue in the case and 
to identify the object of the claim. It has never been contested 
that the Court is entitled to interpret the submissions of the parties, 
and in fact is bound to do so; this is one of the attributes of its 
judicial functions. . . . 62 
In the circumstances of the present case, although the Appli-
cant has in its Application used the traditional formula of asking the 
Court "to adjudge and declare" ... the Court must ascertain the 
true object and purpose of the claim and in doing so it cannot 
confine itself to the ordinary meaning of the words used .... 63 
If the Judgment thus seems to establish an objective test as 
to the nature of the issue before the Court and, by implication, 
severely to limit the ability of the individual parties to shape and 
control the practical exercise of the Court's discretionary law-
61. Id. at 325. 
62. Id. at 262. 
63. Id. at 263. 
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making rote, the Joint Dissenting Opinion concedes on this point to 
the subjective intentions of the parties: 
Basically, the Judgment is grounded on the premise that the 
sole object of the claim of Australia is "to obtain a termination of' 
the "atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the South 
Pacific region" (para. 30) .... 
In our view the basic premise of the Judgment, which limits the 
Applicant's submissions to a single purpose, and narrowly circum-
scribes its objective in pursuing the present proceedings, is uutena-
ble. In consequence the Court's claim of reasoning leads to an erro-
neous conclusion. This occurs, we think, partly because the Judg-
ment fails to take account of the purpose and utility of a request for 
a declaratory judgment and even more because its basic premise 
fails to correspond to and even changes the nature and scope of 
Australia's formal submissions as presented in the Application.64 
Concerning this joinder of issues between majority and minor-
ity judges in the Court's final judgment of December 20, 197 4, it can 
be said that the intellectual conflict cannot be resolved by consider-
ations of traditional legal logic. The basic conflict goes to differing 
conceptions of the ·nature and scope of the judicial office and of the 
proper role of courts in community policy-making, and to the 
differing approaches to the exercise of court jurisdiction inherent in 
those conceptions. The appraisal of the legal merits of each of these 
conceptions must turn, ultimately, on political considerations such 
as the relative degree of common-sense and realism involved in 
each, having regard to the necessarily dependent role of the courts, 
in general, as organs of community policy-making, and to the spe-
cial limitations imposed upon the World Court in particular, in 
comparison to national supreme courts, for purposes of the elabora-
tion, refinement and concrete application of new norms of law-the 
limited, "term-of-years" character of the judicial office on the 
bench of the World Court; the essentially voluntary, consensual 
aspect of its jurisdiction; the absence of a firm and effective en-
forcement power; and the diffuse, pluralistic character of the 
community in respect to which it must operate. 
The second main part of the four Judges' Joint Dissenting 
Opinion goes to the question of whether the Court had jurisdiction 
over France in the circumstances of the present case. 65 This question 
64. Id. at 312. 
65. Note the Joint Dissenting Opinion's criticism of the Court's reasoning on this point: 
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had been passed over sub silentio in the majority opinion of the 
Court of December 20, 1974, though in the spirit of that opinion, it 
would be an irrelevant question in light of the Court's actual holding 
that the issue had become moot. The four majority Judges append-
ing individual, specially concurring opinions to the final judgment 
-Judges Forster, Gros, Petren and Ignacio-Pinto had, however, all 
firmly rejected any question of Court jurisdiction over France in the 
circumstances of the case, while embracing also the opinion of the 
Court that the affair had become moot. 
The four Judges' Joint Dissenting Opinion's affirmation of the 
existence of jurisdiction over France in the present case66 is rested 
principally upon France's accession to the General Act of 1928, upon 
the absence from such French accession of any exception as to "na-
tional defence," upon the rejection of the argument that the General 
Act of 1928 had fallen into desuetude with the disappearance of the 
old League of Nations system67 and upon a conclusion as to the 
continued binding force of the General Act as between Australia and 
France. 68 The four Judges also rejected the argument that the 
French government's 1966 declaration of adherence to the Court's 
jurisdiction, with its exclusion, specifically and in terms, as to "na-
tional defence," prevailed over the French adherence under the 
General Act of 1928.69 
It must be added that Judge de Castro, in his individual dis-
senting opinion to the Court's final judgment, 70 put forward essen-
tially the same arguments in favor of the existence of Court juris-
diction over France in the facts of the present case. He went on from 
there, in contending for the admissibility of the Australian-New 
Zealand application, to argue that on the basis of the general duty 
It is difficult for us to understand the basis upon which the Court could reach 
substantive findings of fact and law such as those imposing on France an interna-
tional obligation to refrain from further nuclear tests in the Pacific, from which the 
Court deduces that the case "no longer has any object", without any prior finding 
that the Court is properly seised of the dispute and has jurisdiction to entertain it. 
The present Judgment by implication concedes that a dispute existed at the time of 
the Application .... 
The conclusion thus seems to us unavoidable that the Court, in the process of 
rendering the present Judgment, has exercised substantive jurisdiction without hav-
ing first made a determination of its existence and the legal grounds upon which that 
jurisdiction rests. 
Id. at 325. 
66. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 326-58. 
67. Id. at 329-35. 
68. Id. at 337-45. 
69. Id. at 346-52. 
70. Id. at 372. 
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of each state not to use its territory for acts contrary to the rights of 
other states71 as exemplified by the Swiss federal litigation between 
the Cantons of Solothurn and Aargaut, and the U.S.-Canada Trail 
Smelter Arbitration, Australia and New Zealand were entitled to 
argue the substantive law question of France's duty to put an end 
to the deposit of radioactive fall-out on their territory.72 
The remaining individual dissenting opinion, that of ad hoc 
Judge Barwick is the longest opinion filed in the Court's final judg-
ment, but it does not go significantly beyond the international law 
arguments canvassed in the other dissenting opinions.73 
IX. AN INARTICULATE MAJOR PREMISE TO THE 
COURT'S FINAL JUDGMENT? THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PARTIES: THE AUSTRALIAN "LEAK" OF THE COURT'S 
JUDGMENT ON THE INTERIM ORDER 
The Australian government's enthusiastic endorsement of, or 
cooperation in, the British and U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific, over 
a sustained period of years gave rise, as we have seen above, if not 
to a direct estoppel against the Australian government in its current 
complaint against the French nuclear tests, at least to the invoca-
tion of general equitable principles, going to equality of treatment 
and to the notion that a state cannot apply a double standard in its 
international relations, by reserving one treatment for its favored 
allies and quite another and lesser treatment for all others.74 The 
relative insensitiveness on this point, on the part of the Australian 
government, is one of the more striking features of its political han-
dling of the French Nuclear Tests Case: the Australian government 
never seemed aware that a mere change in the internal, political 
complexion of the government of a state cannot derogate from ordi-
71. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 3, 22. 
72. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253, 388-90. 
73. Id. at 391-455. 
74. There is an historical irony in the fact that ad hoc Judge Barwick (nominated by 
Australia and New Zealand, in terms of Article 31(2) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, to sit on the Court for purposes of the French Nuclear Tests process) had been a 
key member (Attorney-General, 1958-64; Minister for External Affairs, 1961-64) of the 
Conservative coalition government of Australia, that held power at the federal level through-
out much of the period of the Australian endorsement of and active cooperation in British 
and U.S. nuclear tests in the South Pacific region generally or in Australia itself. Appointed 
Chief Justice of Australia in 1964, directly from federal politics, Chief Justice Barwick had 
earlier had a distinguished career as an advocate at the Bar, (though never, because of the 
nature of Australian legal practice, having worked in international law). See generally WHo's 
WHO IN AUSTRALIA 85 (21st ed. 1974). 
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nary international law principles as to the continuity of state per-
sonality and the notion that actions of any one government of a state 
are normally binding upon its successors. 
Allowing, as the U.N. General Assembly Committee on 
Friendly Relations has recognized in its final report and accompany-
ing Declaration of Principles, 75 that judicial settlement is only one 
method (and not necessarily the best method) of international 
problem-solving, one may wonder why the Australian government 
chose to escalate to the method of a formal complaint to the World 
Court without fully exhausting the more conventional and low-key 
diplomatic methods which the lack of substantial equities on its 
own part-due to the prior Australian involvement in its own allies' 
nuclear tests in the Pacific-might have suggested as the wiser 
course. Was it the fact that the present Australian government had 
chosen to make the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons 
a main plank in its successful election campaign that had unseated 
the long-time Conservative coalition government of Australia, 76 and 
that a judicial test seemed to offer more mileage from the public 
relations viewpoint? In any event, the World Court's final judgment 
of December 20, 1974, in taking the Court out of the affair alto-
gether, removed any possibility of the Court's becoming embroiled, 
by indirection, in past internal, political conflicts with a litigating 
state. 
One bizarre episode, associated with the Court's decision on the 
Interim Order of June 22, 1973, tends to confirm the reservations 
already suggested as to the political wisdom and good judgment of 
the Australian government's tactical approach to conflicts-
resolution. On June 21, 1973, one day before the Court's decision on 
75. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; G.A. Res. 
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1971): 
Every State shall settle its international disputes with other States by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered. 
States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their international 
disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their 
choice. In seeking such a settlement, the parties shall agree upon such peaceful 
means as may be appropriate to the circumstances and nature of the dispute. 
The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of failure to reach a solution 
by any one of the above peaceful means, to continue to seek a settlement of the 
dispute by other peaceful means agreed upon by them. 
76. See Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974) I.C.J. 253, 279-
80 (J. Gros, concurring). 
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the Interim Order was read at a public sitting, the Prime Minister 
of Australia announced at a public dinner in Australia that the 
World Court's decision would be eight to six in favor of Australia, 77 
thus correctly forecasting the actual announcment by the Court. In 
a subsequent letter of June 27, 1973, the Australian Prime Minister 
suggested that this forecast had been no more than speculation on 
his part.78 
In a special declaration annexed to the Court's final judgment 
of December 20, 1974, Judge-President Lachs commented, on behalf 
of the Court majority: 
Good administration of justice and respect for the Court require 
that the outcome of its deliberations be kept in strict secrecy and 
nothing of its decision be published until it is officially rendered. It 
was therefore regrettable that in the present case, prior to the public 
reading of the Court's Order of June 22, 1973, a statement was made 
and press reports appeared which exceeded what is legally admissi-
ble in relation to a case sub judice. 
The Court was seriously concerned with the matter and an 
enquiry was ordered in the course of which all possible avenues 
accessible to the Court were explored. 
The Court concluded, by a resolution of 21 March 197 4, that 
its investigations had not enabled it to identify any specific source 
of the statements and reports published. 
I remain satisfied that the Court had done everything possible 
in this respect and that it dealt with the matter with all seriousness 
for which it called. 79 
Judge Gros, in his specially concurring opinion, threw some 
further light on the episode, in commenting upon the Court's resolu-
tion, adopted by a majority vote of 11 to 3, on March 21, 1974,80 to 
close its investigation of the Australian "leak." Judge Gros regarded 
the "leak" as a breach of Article 54(3) of the Court Statute, requir-
ing the deliberations of the Court to "take place in private and 
remain secret. " 81 In seeming to reject what he characterized as "the 
crystal-gazing explanation relied on by the [Australian] Prime 
77. Id. at 293. 
78. Id. at 294. 
79. Id. at 273. 
80. International Court of Justice, Communique no. 74/2, March 26, 1974 [1973-1974] 
l.C.J.Y.B. 127-128. See also Lacharriere, Cour internationale de justice: Commentaires sur 
la position juridique de la France a l'egard de la liceite de ses experiences nucleaires, 19 
ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INT'L 235, 250-51 (1973). 
81. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C.J. 253, 293. 
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Minister ... with the attribution of an oracular rOle to the Austra-
lian advisers,"82 Judge Gros declared himself convinced that: 
[A] judicially conducted enquiry could have elucidated the chan-
nels followed by the multiple disclosures noted in this case, the 
continuity and accuracy of which suggest that the truth of the mat-
ter was not beyond the Court's reach. Such is the meaning of my 
refusal of the resolution of March 21, 197 4, terminating an investiga-
tion which was begun with reluctance, conducted without persist-
ence and concluded without reason.83 
Judge Petren, in his specially concurring opinion, also indi-
cated that he had voted against the resolution to conclude enquiry: 
... I wish to state my opinion that the enquiry referred to was one 
of a judicial character and that its continuance on the bases already 
acquired should have enabled the Court to get closer to the truth. I 
did not agree with the decision whereby the Court excluded from 
publication, in the volume of Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents to be devoted to the case, certain documents which to 
my mind are important for the comprehension of the incident and 
the search for its origins.84 
On the other hand, the four Judges taking part in the Joint 
Dissenting Opinion, joined this time by Judge Bengzon, issued a 
joint declaration upholding the Court against criticisms that it was 
tardy or dilatory in its follow-up to the Australian "leak": 
The examination of the matter carried out by the Court did not 
enable it to identify any specific source of the information on which 
were based the statements and press reports to which the President 
[Judge Lachs] has referred. When the Court, by eleven votes to 
three, decided to conclude its examination it did so for the solid 
reason that to pursue its investigations and enquiries would, in its 
view, be very unlikely to produce further useful information.85 
The Australian Prime Minister, for his part, immediately after 
the Court's final judgment of December 20, 1974, refusing the Aus-
tralian application, made his symbolic trip to Canossa by going to 
Paris and officially calling on President Giscard d'Estaing. 86 
82. Id. at 294. 
83. Id. at 296. 
84. Id. at 298, n.l. 
85. Id. at 273. 
86. Le Monde, (Paris) Selection Hebdomadaire, January 2-8, 1975, at 4. 
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X. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION AND THE FRENCH NUCLEAR 
TESTS CASE: AN APPRAISAL 
For the student of sociology of law (and especially for one in the 
tradition of Julius Stone) the most interesting aspects of the French 
Nuclear Tests case are those concerning the international law-
making process, and the special political-institutional role of the 
World Court in comparison to other organs of world community 
policy-making. 
The Court emerges as the proponent of judicial self-restraint 
in the final judgment of December 20, 1974, though, be it noted, a 
judicial self-restraint fully consonant with the rigorously procedural 
approach to judicial policy-making insisted upon by well-known 
judicial liberals such as Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the Court's de-
liberations are obviously secret, in accordance with the judicial 
practice of the Court, the President is an ex officio member of the 
Drafting Committee and it may safely be assumed that the 
President has played a role in any opinion of the Court signed by 
him. President Lachs, like Brandeis and Frankfurter, has a proven 
record of judicial imagination and judicial innovation, demon-
strated in concrete problem-situations where the jurisdictional 
grounds are right. As evidence of this, his approach to the interna-
tional law-making process has always been flexible and creative, 
whether he has been wearing the hat of the lawyer-diplomat, the 
lawyer-jurisconsult or the lawyer-judge. 
Thus, as a U.N. General Assembly national delegate and as a 
law professor, Dr. Lachs cut through the sterile juridical formalism 
that would deny normative legal quality to the principle barring the 
orbiting of nuclear weapons in space vehicles, simply because it did 
not, in its origins and prior to its concretization in treaty form in 
the Space Treaty of January 27, 1967,87 fit into the historical group 
of closed categories of formal sources of law. While the avant-garde 
might claim the principle as an international legal norm, prior to 
its rendition in treaty form, by virtue of its root in a U .N. General 
Assembly Resolution of October 17, 1963, 88 a seeming majority of 
contemporary jurists would deny any law-making quality to U.N. 
87. Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1974). 
88. G.A. Res. 1884, U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964). See also 
Stevenson, U.N. Calls on States to Refrain from Orbiting Weapons, 49 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 
753 (1963). 
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General Assembly resolutions, as such. Rather than provoke an 
interminable debate over a complex political-institutional question 
of contemporary international organization, going to the arenas for 
international law-making, and thus delay recognition of an emer-
gent new legal principle that is basic to international security and 
cooperation, why not cut through to the facts? The two key partici-
pants having the technological capacity to orbit nuclear weapons in 
space vehicles-the Soviet Union and the United States-had each 
sufficiently indicated their intention to observe the principle and to 
accept it as legally binding upon them; so why not accept this legal 
fact as creating, in itself, a congruent legal norm?89 The law profes-
sor from Eastern Europe thus joins hands with contemporary North 
American post-legal realist thinking on law as fact! 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 90 Judge Lachs, in his 
dissenting opinion, continued his creative approach to the inter-
national law-making process in suggesting that West Germany 
might be bound by the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, even though West Germany had never 
ratified the Convention, since those principles, by virtue of the near 
universality of their acceptance by states, had now become part of 
general, customary international law.91 On that occasion he also 
stressed the importance of governmental statements and the reli-
ance upon them.91.1 
This line of thought is continued in the World Court's Advisory 
Opinion of 1971 on South-West Africa, 92 where the Court makes 
important advances in regard to the development of new principles 
of international law and, perhaps even more importantly, in regard 
89. See Lachs, The International Law of Outer Space, 113 RECUEIL DES CouRS 1, 97-99 
(1964); Lachs, The Law-making Process for Outer Space, NEw FRONTIERS IN SPACE LAW 13 
(E. McWhinney & M. Bradley eds. 1969); M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERI-
ENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 109 (1972). 
90. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] l.C.J. 3. 
91. Id. at 229-30 (Lachs, J., dissenting); see also Goldie, The North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases: a Ray of Hope for the International Court?, 16 N.Y.L.F. 327, 357-58 (1970) . 
91.1. States may obviously change their intentions, conduct and policies, but it 
would seriously undermine the words of and reliance upon statements made by 
governments if value-judgments of so important a nature were disregarded or held 
as not binding upon governments which made them. 
Id. at 236. 
92. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276, [1971] l.C.J . 16. See Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which U.N. Resolu-
tions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter? , 21 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 270 (1972). 
Compare McDougal, 67 AM. Soc'v INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS 293 (1973). See generally Bernhardt, 
Homogenitiit, Kontinuitiit und Dissonanzen in der Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Ger-
ichtshofs: Eine Fall-Studie zum Sildwestafrika/Namibia-Komplex, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUS-
LANDISCHES ~FFENTLICHES RECHT UND V~LKERRECHT 1 (1973). 
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to the giving of new content to old principles. The Court's opinion, 
taking a dynamic view of the concept of intertemporal law, goes on 
to give a new and contemporary connotation to illegality that has 
important implications for apartheid, and also displays an unaccus-
tomed flexibility as to international legal fact-finding and the role 
of judicial notice. Finally, the Court's opinion easily crosses the 
legal positivist barriers against acceptance of the proposition that 
the general principles of international law may be binding even 
upon a non-member state of an international organisation.92·1 
This review is prologue to the basic question of why a Court 
majority with a demonstrated record of imagination, innovation and 
leadership in the creation and refinement of new norms of law and 
in the international law-making process in general, should prefer the 
course of judicial self-restraint in the French Nuclear Tests Case. 
Sociological jurisprudence, with its attention to the wise choice of 
arenas and techniques for the effectuation of community policy-
making can, I think, help us in understanding the Court majority's 
choice in the French Nuclear Tests Case. 
First, recognizing that particular cases serve, in the ultimate, 
as the vehicles for judicial policy-making, there is obviously a cer-
tain margin of judicial discretion available as to the choice of the 
particular case to serve as the foundation for policy-making ven-
tures.93 While the World Court's docket is certainly more limited 
92.1. Compare, also, Judge Lachs's declaration, made in the Appeal Relating to the 
Jurisdiction of the !CAO Council (India v. Pakistan) (Judgment), [1972] I.C.J. 46, 72-75, 
where he stresses that "[g]reat caution and restraint have been exercised by this Court and 
its predecessor when ascertaining their own jurisdiction." Id. at 73. Judge Lachs then goes 
on to say that: 
This restraint has had its raison d'etre in the clear tendency not to impose more 
onerous obligations on States than those they have expressly assumed. However, in 
regard to appeals from other fora, this very criterion imposes limits on the Court's 
caution in assuming jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the same reasons which underlie the necessity of interpreting jurisdic-
tional clauses strictly impel one to adopt an interpretation of provisions for appeal 
that would lend maximum effect to the safeguards inherent in such provisions. For, 
as between the "lower forum" and the "court of appeal", there exists as it were a 
see-saw of jurisdictional powers. Hence to apply a restrictive interpretation of rights 
of appeal-and thus of the power of the "court of appeal"-would obviously entail 
an extensive interpretation of the jurisdictional powers of the "court of first in-
stance." 
Id. at 74. 
93. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 365-66 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opin-
ion); PESCATORE, LE DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION 74 et seq. (1972); see also Pescatore (with Donner, 
Monaco and Kutscher), Aspects of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 
Interest from the Point of View of International Law, 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES 
aFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VaLKERRECHT 239 {1972); Pescatore, Federalisme et integration: 
remarques liminaires, in FEDERALISM AND SUPREME COURTS AND THE INTEGRATION OF LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, (McWhinney & Pescatore, eds. 1973) . 
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than that of national supreme courts and so it cannot be quite as 
cavalier as those other courts in rejecting the obviously flawed re-
cords as possible candidates for "test case" status, the fact remains 
that the Australian-New Zealand Application, by national supreme 
court standards, hardly seemed an adequate base for any sustained 
judicial policy-making ventures. This conclusion flows inevitably, I 
think, from the compromised character of the Australian and New 
Zealand complaints against France, granted their past twenty years 
of positive support for British and U.S. nuclear test explosions in 
the Pacific area generally and in Australia itself. Pious protestations 
by the newly-elected governments could not wipe clean the slate 
from twenty years of practice by their predecessor governments. The 
supervening Fiji intervention in the case, 94 while no doubt free from 
this particular flaw, suffered from the fact that it arrived tardily and 
apparently without any prior record of concern or protest against 
nuclear tests in the Pacific, under whatever national sponsorship 
(British, American, French). A further fact contributing to the 
flawed character of the Australian-New Zealand Applications, and 
inhibiting their utility as a really satisfactory vehicle for sustained 
judicial policy-making was the never properly explained "leak" by 
the Australian Prime Minister of the Court's Interim Order and of 
the actual judicial vote thereon. It raised questions of the respect 
for the integrity of the judicial process on the part of the moving 
parties in what was, after all, an adversary proceeding. If the safe-
guarding of the judicial process might not necessarily suggest an 
automatic verdict for the respondent, in the absence of explanations 
from the applicants that the Court as a whole would regard as 
sufficient, it still would render very difficult any Court decision, on 
the merits, in favor of the applicants, granted the bizarre circum-
stances of the Australian "leak." 
As a second question, on the particular facts of the Australian-
New Zealand complaint, especially including those facts found by 
the complaining parties themselves and therefore presumably be-
yond their capacity to put in issue, it may be doubted whether the 
complaining parties satisfactorily discharged their burden of estab-
lishing even a prima facie case of damage to themselves resulting 
from the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. This evident 
failure goes both to the substantive international law counts upon 
94. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Application by Fiji for Permission to 
Intervene, [1973] I.C.J. 320; Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Application by 
Fiji for Permission to Intervene, [1973] I.C.J. 324. 
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which the complainant states sought to base their application for 
relief against France, in which damage is a necessary element, and 
also to the existence even of a sufficient legal interest to give the 
complaining states locus standi in the case. This conjunction of 
lacunae in the Australian-New Zealand complaint going both to its 
substantive and its adjectival law bases, confirms the general im-
pression that the two states' applications hardly represented a use-
ful occasion for judicial legislation in an important developing area 
of the "new" international law-namely, the international law of 
environmental protection, involving the duty of any one state not 
gratuitously to do damage to other states. 
As a third, and much more fundamental question, the Court's 
jurisdiction ultimately rests on the voluntary consent of the parties. 
The consensual basis of the Court's jurisdiction, in sharp contradis-
tinction to those national supreme courts that effectively indulge in 
judicial legislation, means that the Court must exercise great prud-
ence as to invoking strained or difficult legal constructions as a 
ground for seeking to impose its jurisdiction upon unwilling states. 
When so many states that are committed to expanding and 
strengthening the rule of law in the world community either have 
not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or else, like 
Canada in regard to its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 
1970, have found reasons for cutting down and limiting the juris-
diction already conferred on the Court, 95 it may be suggested that 
it ill behooves the Court to try to drag states to the court-room 
door. The political consequence is likely to be that they may not 
appear, or that they may withdraw or cut down whatever juris-
diction they have already conferred on the Court. The French 
government's political response to the World Court's hair-line, 
(eight to six) majority granting the Interim Order of June 22, 1973, 
was a formal advice to the United Nations on January 2, 197 4, that 
France was withdrawing forthwith her acceptance of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court as of January 10, 1974.96 This was a 
95. See generally Pharand, Oil Pollution Control in the Canadian Arctic, 7 TEXAS INT'L 
L. J. 45 (1971); compare Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New 
Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1970). 
96. See Cot, Affaires des essais nucleaires (Australie cf France et Nouvelle Zeland cf 
France): Demandes en indication des mesures conservatoires. Ordonnances du 22 juin 1973, 
19 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;IAIS DE DROIT INT'L 252 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cot]; Pinto, La France 
et al Cour internationale de justice, Le Monde (Paris), Dec. 22-23, 1974, at 7, col. 1; 
Lachairriere, supra note 80, at 251. See generally Retrait par le gouvernement fran<;ais de son 
acceptation de lat juridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale de justice (10 janvier 
1974), 78 REVUE GENERELE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 822 (1974). 
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body-blow that the Court could hardly afford to sustain from one 
of its long-time champions and original Founding Fathers, 97 but 
one, it may be suggested, that might have been anticipated as a po-
litical consequence of the majority decision on the Interim Order.98 
97. Les ordonnances rendues le 22 juin 1973 par la Cour internationale de justice 
dans Les affaires des Essais nucleaires marquent un tournant decisif dans !'attitude 
de la France a l'egard de la juridiction internationale. II est inutile de rappeler la 
tradition fran<;aise . .. Notre pays a joue un role decisif dans !'institution d'une 
juridiction internationale. Les Contributions d'un Louis Renault, d'un Albert de 
Laprade/le ou d'un Jules Basdevant illustrent ce long combat de nos juristes, adosse 
a la ferme volonte des gouvernements successifs. Jamais, lorsque lajuridiction inter-
nationale a ete menacee, la France n'a menage son soutien a l'institution. Sur ce 
point, la Ve Republique, pourtant hostile a toute notion de supranationalite et jal-
ouse gardienne de /'independence nationale, est restee fidele a cette politique. Elle a 
detendu, au sein des Nations Unies, la Cour internationale de justice et la juridic-
tion obligatoire. Aujourd'hui, le Gouvernement franc;ais rompt avec ce passe. 
[The decisions rendered on June 22, 1973, by the International Court of Justice 
on Nuclear Tests mark a decisive change in the attitude of France in regard to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. It is unnecessary to recall the French tradition .. .. Our 
country has played a decisive role in the institution of an international jurisdiction. 
The contributions of a Louis Renault, an Albert de Lapradelle or a Jules Basdevant 
illustrate the long struggle of our jurists, reinforcing the firm will of successive govern-
ments. When the jurisdiction of the court has been threatened, France has never 
withheld her support. On this point, the 5th Republic, although hostile to any notion 
of supranationality and protective of national independence, has remained faithful 
to this policy. It has defended the International Court of Justice and its compulsory 
jurisdiction in the United Nations itself. Today, the French government breaks with 
the past.] 
Cot, supra note 106, at 252. 
98. Les ordonnances de juin 1974 ont provoque le refus gouvernmental franc;ais 
d'accepter, a partir du 10 janvier 1974, la competence obligatoire de la Cour interna-
tionale de justice dans ses differends d'ordre juridique avec d'autres Etats. Cette 
decision, prise sans consultation ni debat parlementaire, fait bon marche d'une tradi-
tion presque seculaire de notre diplomatie . ... 
Ecartons l'un des motifs du retrait de la France, /'indiscretion qui a permis au 
premier ministre australien de conna1tre le sens de la decision de la Cour et la 
majorit~ obtenue, sans pour autant que des sanctions soient prises, malgre plusieurs 
demarches officielles, contre les responsables. . . . 
Beaucoup lus grave est le second motif de retrait. Le gouvernement fran<;ais ne 
peut faire confiance a la Cour actuelle pour se declarer incompetente dans Les cas 
reserves par sa declaration relative a la competence obligatoire de la Cour . ... 
Les tensions actuelles ant rapproche dangereusement la Cour du point de la 
rupture. Fallait-il pour autant que la France frappe le coup de grace sans donner 
/'occasion a la Cour, par sa presence, de se ressaiser? 
[The decisions of June, 1974, have caused the French government, as of January 
10, 1974, to refuse to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice. This decision, made without parliamentary consultation or debate, does 
away with a long standing diplomatic tradition. . . . 
Let us set aside one explanation for the change in France's position, the indiscre-
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The majority decision in the final judgment of December 20, 1974, 
thus appears in retrospect more and more like a necessary, even if 
somewhat belated, political corrective to what Charles Evans 
Hughes, speaking of the Dred Scott decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, characterized as one of the Court's great self-inflicted 
wounds.99 The over-all lesson, from a comparison of the two judg-
ments of the Court in the French Nuclear Tests Case, would seem 
to be that a high political dispute that might better, in all the po-
litical circumstances of the case, have been settled by conventional 
diplomatic means through the give-and-take of bilateral negotia-
tions and exchange, in conventional international political arenas, 
was prematurely or over-hastily brought into the international 
judicial arena, 100 and that it just did not serve as a satisfactory ve-
hicle for sustained judicial policy-making in a major new area of 
international legal concern. 10I The final judgment of December 20, 
tion that has permitted the Australian prime minister to know the direction of the 
Court's decision and the positions of the judges, without any sanctions being imposed 
against those responsible, despite several official overtures. . . . 
Much more serious is the second explanation for the change. The French govern-
ment cannot trust the current Court to decline jurisdiction in those cases which are 
made exceptions in the French declaration concerning the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court. . . . 
The current tensions have brought the Court dangerously close to the breaking 
point. Was it necessary for France to strike the final blow without giving the Court 
the chance, by its presence, to restore itself?] 
Pinto, supra note 96 (footnotes omitted). See generally Waldock, Decline of the Optional 
Clause, 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 244 (1955-56). 
99. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See C. HUGHES, supra note 46, at 
50-51. 
100. Compare H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 75-115 (1958); Fitzmaurice, Judicial Innovation: Its Uses and Its Perils, in 
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 24 (1965); 
Vallat, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, id. at 155, 165-67; Munch, Das Wesen der 
Rechtsprechung als Leitbegriff fur die Tiitigkeit des lnternati Munch, terichtshofs, 31 
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO VOLERRECHT 712 (1971); Gross, The 
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the 
International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971); Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public 
International Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of Today, in 
INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 1873-1973: EVOLUTIONS ET PERSPEC-
TIVES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 196 (1973). 
101. Compare the remarks by Judge Gros, made before the Nuclear Tests Case: 
L 'adage 'la paix par le droit' correspondait a un etat d'esprit dans une certaine 
periode de l'histoire. Le vaste mouvement d'idees en faveur de l'arbitrage interna-
tional, parallelement au desarmement pour creer la securite, a la suite des tensions 
politiques qui culminerent dans la premiere guerre mondiale, ne pouvait garder la 
meme infiuence dans un monde ou les confiits dont saisis soit par des organes poli-
tiques de Nations Unies, soit par des Etats directment interesses, dont l'entente 
realisee sur des bases politiques, s 'avere indispensable pour le reglement de ces con-
fiits. 
37
McWhinney: Nuclear Tests Cases
Published by SURFACE, 1975
46 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:9 
197 4, should, on this thesis, succeed in minimizing any damage to 
the Court caused by the premature venture into judicial policy-
making in the Interim Order of June 22, 1973, 102 and it offers the 
extra premium of some valuable new additions to international legal 
doctrine, particularly as to the normative legal effect of conduct, 
including unilateral acts or declarations, by individual states and 
as to the principle of good faith as a cardinal principle of the new 
international law of cooperation that one hopes is succeeding to the 
era of the detente. 103 
[The adage, "peace through the law," reflects a state of mind in a certain period 
of history. The vast movement of ideas in favor of international arbitration, parallel-
ing disarmament for the sake of security following political tensions that culminated 
in the first world war, could not maintain the same influence in a world in which 
conflicts are resolved by the political organs of the United Nations or by the states 
directly interested, whose agreements at the political level prove to be indispensable 
to the settlement of conflicts.] 
Gros, A propos de cinquante annees de justice internationale, 76 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 
INT'L Pueuc 5, 10-11 (1972) . See also Gros, Quelques remarques sur la practique du droit 
international, in MELANGES OFFERTS A CHARLES RousSEA. LA CoMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE 113, 
124 (1974), wherein he writes: 
Une saine autocritique montre les limites de toute amelioration du role de la Cour: 
nous sommes dans un domaine au le lyrisme ne peut voiler a realite. 
[A healthy self criticism shows the limits of any improvements in the role of the 
Court: we are in a domain in which lyricism cannot conceal reality.] 
102. See in this regard, the remarks by Judge Petren, also made before the French 
Nuclear Tests Case: 
It must ... be kept in mind that a party that has raised an objection to the Court's 
jurisdiction to determine a case has the right to expect that the court will not give 
judgment on the merits therefore, should the said objection be upheld by the court. 
Would it not then be strange if the court, while upholding the objection to its jurisdic-
tion, were nevertheless to examine the merits of the case, and to declare, for example, 
that the contentions of the applicant party were well founded in law? And would 
states not be still more reluctant to accept the court's jurisdiction than they are 
already today, if they were to learn that valid objections to the court's jurisdiction 
or to the receivability of an application will not always prevent the court from making 
statements on matters that the court, by upholding the objection, has found not to 
be properly brought before it? 
Petren, Differences of Procedure between International and National Tribunals, in THOUGHTS 
FROM THE LAKE OF TIME 27, 39 (Burchard ed. 1971); see also Petr6n, Quelques reflexions sur 
la revision du reglement de la Cour internationale de Justice, in MELANGES OFFERTS A CHARLES 
ROUSSEAU-LA COMMUNAUTt INTERNATIONALE 187 (1974). 
103. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] l.C .J. 253, 267-68. 
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